Introduction
Human rights claims are often motivated by weighty considerations. But few motivating factors are arguably as powerful as those which typically underpin claims involving the right to freedom of religion and belief under Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In such cases litigants often consider that they have a sacred duty to act (or refrain from acting) in a particular way, believing that failure to do so may displease a supreme being or even lead to dire consequences in an afterlife, perhaps for all eternity. To date the courts have acknowledged, in express terms, the unparalleled and existential significance of particular manifestations of religious belief to believers themselves. British judges have made a number of statements in which they have accepted the centrality of faith in the lives of those bringing such claims before them, recognising that in view of religion's association with the transcendental, the divine and the eternal, it is the most important thing for many people. 1 However, although judges avowedly recognise the subjective importance of manifestations of religious belief, there has been a tendency for the courts to permit such manifestations to be restricted by legislatures and governments with relative ease, occasionally in pursuit of seemingly 4 believe that particular manifestations of religion or belief are of existential importance, they (the courts) remain unable to give voice to these beliefs so as to reflect, adequately, the importance placed upon them by believers. In short there is an absence of vocabulary-an ineffability-which prevents a court in a modern liberal democracy from taking account of manifestations of belief in a way that adequately conveys the profundity with which claimants hold these very beliefs.
This disconnect is closely associated with the sense of unease that appears to characterise judicial decision making in respect of religious claims-an unease which often leads, in turn, to the courts affording considerable discretion to legislatures and governments when restrictions are imposed on manifestations of religious belief. 10 Whilst willing to accept the great significance of particular manifestations of belief to the claimants themselves, the courts find such manifestations important for very different reasons than people of faith. Thus, unlike the believer, for whom the religious manifestation or practice is important because they believe the underlying doctrine to be true, judges accept that religion is to be valued for reasons such as respect for individual autonomy, collective identity or the need for pluralism in a democratic society. 11 As a result UK courts have often been willing to accept that, notwithstanding the importance of religion to the individuals concerned, legislatures and governments are better placed (due to their democratic credentials and/or superior expertise) than judges to assess the necessity of restrictions on manifestations of religious belief.
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In this regard our argument is not that the UK courts have necessarily made the wrong decisions when adjudicating on the basis of Article 9 of the ECHR. Rather, it is their reasoning and, in particular, the 10 We use the terms 'deference', 'due deference', 'margin of discretion' and 'latitude' interchangeably in this article to refer to the 'area of discretionary judgment' afforded by domestic courts under the Human Rights Act 1998. We use the term 'margin of appreciation' only in the context of the jurisprudence of the European way in which their decisions have been characterised by the affording of judicial deference, that is problematic. 13 We contend that, in deciding many of the cases under Article 9, the same results could have been reached without such excessive margins of discretion being afforded by the judges to the executive and/or legislature, since the state's arguments for restriction in most of these cases would have been relatively strong in any case. The courts' tendency to grant decision-makers a wide margin of discretion in the field of religion and belief, has served to muddy further what are (given the challenges of accommodating faith in a predominantly secular age) already murky waters, making judges appear to be loath to protect religious human rights. Perhaps even more significantly, the use of such judicial deference in future Article 9 cases may well have a decisive effect upon their outcome, even in those cases where the state's arguments for restriction are comparatively weak. That the risk of this is real can be seen in a case whose particular facts illustrate graphically the 'disconnect' highlighted above, the Administrative Court's decision in Ghai v Newcastle City
Council, where a local council's refusal to allow a Hindu man to be cremated on an outdoor funeral pyre was held not to breach Article 9. 14 In this case the wide latitude afforded by the court resulted in a serious undervaluing of the religious manifestation at stake, in pursuit of a remarkably tenuous governmental/legislative aim. The case of Ghai, we suggest, provides a cautionary tale and a timely warning of possible problems associated with the affording of due deference in relation to Article 9. If the logic of the Administrative Court in Ghai were to inform future adjudication, this would almost 13 Constraints of space demand that, for the purposes of this article, we consider only cases that were decided on the basis of Art 9 ECHR, as opposed to ones where the claims were based primarily on discrimination law (such as the Employment Equality (Religion or Belief) Regulations 2003, the Equality Act 2006, and now the Equality Act 2010), which raise different, albeit oft related, issues.
14 Ghai (Admin) (n 1). As will be seen, this decision was overturned by the Court of Appeal, which, as a result of its interpretation of the contested provisions, was able to avoid engaging with the human rights arguments in the case. See n 90 below.
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certainly add weight to the arguments of faith leaders who maintain that the UK courts fail to take religion seriously.
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The article is structured in six parts. Part 2 sketches out the doctrine of public reason as developed by Rawls and (for the sake of balance) briefly outlines some of the relevant critiques. Part 3 summarises
Article 9 of the ECHR, with particular reference to the ways in which the UK courts have applied the principle of proportionality, and have sanctioned curbs on the manifestation of religious freedom in the interests of the public good. Part 4 outlines the Administrative Court's decision in Ghai v
Newcastle City Council, a case whose particular facts illustrate, with great clarity, the 'disconnect' highlighted above. Part 5 suggests why this is a problem, before, tentatively, proposing a way forward. Part 6 is the conclusion.
Rawls's Doctrine of Public Reason
A See Greenawalt (n 34) 7, who argues that this has 'the unappealing feature of encouraging some discrepancy between actual bases of judgment and stated reasons'. Rawls accepted that 'justice as fairness', the theory developed in his earlier Theory of Justice, is an example of such a secular comprehensive world view, 40 but he maintained that political liberalism, with its arguments based on reciprocity and the use of public reason, is a 'freestanding doctrine', independent of such comprehensive world views. 41 In contrast, however, others have argued that even the doctrine of public reason cannot truly be said to stand free of comprehensive doctrines, due to the fact that it is heavily dependent on an 'Enlightenment understanding' of the person, of reason and of rationality.
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Despite these and other doubts as to whether and how Rawls's doctrine applies to citizens, there is nonetheless a general consensus that the courts are, and ought to be, bound by the strictures of public reason-that the judiciary is the exemplar of public reason and should eschew any resort to comprehensive doctrines. 43 Indeed, within the liberal democratic state, this is a principle so well ingrained that it is seldom given explicit recognition. Yet one such instance was the forceful riposte of Kent Greenawalt is an exception, in that, whilst broadly agreeing that the judiciary should not use comprehensive reasons, he accepts that in very limited circumstances (eg in very hard cases) they may be permitted to do so: Greenawalt (n 34) 148-9.
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Lord Carey (n 15).
everyone save the believer religious faith is necessarily subjective, being incommunicable by any kind of proof or evidence. It may of course be true; but the ascertainment of such a truth lies beyond the means by which laws are made in a reasonable society. Therefore it lies only in the heart of the believer, who is alone bound by it. No one else is or can be so bound, unless by his own free choice he accepts its claims.
The promulgation of law for the protection of a position held purely on religious grounds cannot therefore be justified. It is irrational, as preferring the subjective over the objective. But it is also divisive, capricious and arbitrary. We do not live in a society where all the people share uniform religious beliefs. The precepts of any one religionany belief system-cannot, by force of their religious origins, sound any louder in the general law than the precepts of any other. If they did, those out in the cold would be less than citizens; and our constitution would be on the way to a theocracy, which is of necessity autocratic. The law of a theocracy is dictated without option to the people, not made by their judges and governments. The individual conscience is free to accept such dictated law; but the State, if its people are to be free, has the burdensome duty of thinking for itself. Article 9. With such considerations in mind it is necessary to explain (briefly) the right to freedom of religion and belief under Article 9 of the ECHR, before proceeding to summarise the relevant case law in this area.
Freedom of Religion and Belief under Article 9 of the ECHR
A. Article 9: The Constituent Elements
Article 9 of the ECHR provides that:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
2. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
Article 9(1) protects, in absolute terms, the principle of freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
A person may believe whatever they want because the state has no power to interfere with this internal sphere, the forum internum. By contrast, under Article 9(2), the manifestation of religion or belief may be subject to restrictions by the state as long as these are 'prescribed by law', in pursuance of one of the legitimate aims listed, and 'necessary in a democratic society'. This last requirement has been held by the European Court of Human Rights (the European Court) to mean that any restriction must be proportionate to the aim that the state is claiming to protect. and can be discerned by examining the questions that the court asks (and answers) when dealing with an Article 9 claim: is there a 'religion or belief' attracting protection under Article 9?; is there a 'manifestation' of that religion or belief?; has it been subjected to a 'limitation'?; and, if so, is the limitation justified under Article 9(2)? As will be observed, the willingness with which the courts have been prepared to answer the first two of these questions in the affirmative-in accepting that the beliefs of claimants are sincere, and that their manifestations of belief are of central significance to their lives-is in marked contrast to the third, where the arguments of claimants have often been superseded by a judicial willingness to find that the measures taken by the state to impose restrictions on these manifestations have been justified.
(i) Is it a Religion or Belief?
In examining complaints under Article 9 of the ECHR, the court must first make sure that the litigant's avowed 'religion' or 'belief' is 'neither fictitious nor capricious', and is actually protected by Article 9. 51 However, beyond this, judges refuse to inquire as to the asserted belief's 'validity' in relation to the doctrines of the religion in question, 52 and will not assess 'the extent to which the claimant's belief conforms to or differs from the views of others professing the same religion'. 53 just whether a particular manifestation of belief has been 'prescribed by law', 59 but whether it can also be restricted as being 'necessary in a democratic society' in the pursuit of one of the legitimate aims listed in Article 9(2). Typically this means that the court must ask whether the limitation on religious freedom constitutes a proportionate response to a 'pressing social need'.
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The exact form and content of proportionality, as developed by the domestic courts under the HRA, is far from clear, one commentator having described the case law as being 'murky' and a 'muddle'.
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The analysis and formulation most widely accepted and cited is that of Lord Wales, whose members believe that all life (both human and animal) is sacred. In an effort to control the spread of bovine tuberculosis (bTB), which was a particularly serious problem in this area, the Welsh Assembly Government ordered the slaughter of Shambo, the sacred temple bull, which had tested positive as having been exposed to the bTB bacterium. 70 All of the parties accepted that, for this religious community, the bull's destruction 'would be a particularly sacrilegious act, a serious desecration of the temple, and comparable … to the killing of a human being'. 71 Thomas LJ put it thus:
The cornerstone of the beliefs of the … Community is the sanctity of life and the worship of God through caring for its animals. The respondent is utterly committed to the preservation of this life, regarding all animals as having a spark of divinity. The
Community would regard the slaughter of the bullock as a sacrilege and a desecration of their temple.
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The Community's beliefs in relation to the religious significance of Shambo were found to be 'patently sincere and most deeply held'. 73 Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal held, unanimously, that the destruction was a proportionate response to the serious threat to animal and public health, and necessary as part of the overall policy of controlling the spread of the disease, in order to protect the agricultural industry, animal welfare and public health. An infection of bTB but not necessarily the disease, which is detected through post-mortem testing. Factual differences aside, the approach of the courts in Begum, Suryananda and Williamson was similar, for in each of these three cases a margin of discretion was accorded to the primary decision-
makers. The implications of this judicial tendency to defer to primary decision-makers in relation to
determinations under Article 9 of the ECHR will now be explored in more detail.
B. Judicial Deference and Article 9
A key element of the proportionality question that judges must consider in regard to Article 9 is whether the courts should afford a degree of latitude to executive/legislative decision-makers in seeking to balance the rights of the believer and the public interest. In this respect the European Court has typically granted states a wide 'margin of appreciation' in relation to the imposition of restrictions on manifestations of religion or belief. 76 The granting of this margin has been justified on the basis 
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The affording of latitude by domestic courts to other decision-makers has been justified on at least two grounds: first, on the basis that the other body possesses greater democratic legitimacy-that it is elected and its members 'face the consequences of their decisions through their accountability to the electorate'; 80 and secondly, on the ground that the decision-maker has greater expertise or 'relative institutional capacity' than the court in the area under review.
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In all of the domestic decisions outlined above in which proportionality was considered, at least some degree of latitude was afforded to legislative or executive decision-makers based on either their democratic legitimacy or their institutional competence and expertise. An example of the former can be seen in Williamson, where, given the legislative aim (the prevention of physical and mental harm to children), their Lordships held that Parliament was entitled to take the view that all corporal punishment at school was undesirable and unnecessary. 82 It was therefore to be accorded a 'considerable degree of latitude' in this regard. 83 An example of the latter can be seen in Suryananda, where a margin of discretion was granted to the Minister (acting on expert veterinary advice) in Ibid, [51] . It is arguable that this is a case in which latitude was afforded not on the basis of democratic credentials alone, but rather because MPs possessed greater expertise on the issue-it being a difficult one of morality and social policy.
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respect of the order to slaughter Shambo, so as to prevent the spread of bTB. Thomas LJ commented that:
… as the views held by the Minister's advisers were, on the evidence, in conformity with well recognised veterinary and medical opinion, the views of those experts must be given significant weight when considering the margin of discretion to be accorded to the Minister.
… On the totality of the evidence and according a significant margin of discretion to the Minister, I have come therefore to the firm conclusion that the decision to slaughter is justified under Article 9(2) as proportionate in both effect and scope … 84
Similarly, in Begum their Lordships held that special weight should be given to the decision of the school on the balance to be struck in attempting to secure peace and harmony within the multicultural, multi-faith educational environment. According to Lord Bingham:
It was feared that acceding to the respondent's request would or might have significant adverse repercussions. It would … be irresponsible of any court, lacking the experience, background and detailed knowledge of the head teacher, staff and governors, to overrule their judgment on a matter as sensitive as this. The power of decision has been given to them for the compelling reason that they are best placed to exercise it, and I see no reason to disturb their decision.
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The judges' adjudicative task, in all of the domestic cases discussed above, was made easier by the fact that the public goods that were being pursued were relatively clear cut (eg protecting the physical and mental integrity of children, preventing the spread of an animal disease which posed a serious threat to the rural economy, and preserving social harmony in a religiously and racially diverse school). Indeed, it is arguable that the harms (or potential harms) being obviated in the cases above without a significant margin of discretion being afforded by the courts to the respective decisionmakers.
As a consequence, it may be that the true difficulties of adjudicating such claims have, at least to some extent, been masked. In the Article 9 cases that have come before the UK courts to date, judges have effectively been 'let off the hook' of having to really grapple with the question of the appropriate weight/value to be accorded to religious manifestation and practice.
In some ways the recent case of Ghai v Newcastle City Council provides a better illustration of the difficulties that courts encounter in adjudicating religious rights claims. 86 Its specific facts-in particular the unparalleled importance to the individual concerned of the religious right claimed (cremation on an outdoor funeral pyre)-and the relatively trivial harm that was sought to be prevented by its restriction (prevention of offence to those who might be aware that cremations were taking place, without witnessing them directly) mean that the issues discussed above are thrown into especially sharp relief. Our analysis of Ghai-and in particular the decision of Cranston J in the Administrative Court, where he dealt with the human rights issues that the Court of Appeal pointedly refrained from examining-will form the basis of the next section.
Ghai v Newcastle City Council

A. The Facts and Decision in Ghai v Newcastle City Council
Davender Ghai, an orthodox Hindu, believed that in order to achieve a 'good death' and a successful passage to the afterlife his remains needed to be cremated on an outdoor funeral pyre. He believed that fire is the embodiment of the god Agni, and this final sacrifice to him, a Vedic rite known as the anthyesthi samskara, was vital so that his soul could be 'propelled on a transcendental journey towards the land of the forefathers and gods'. Ghai's Article 9 rights. Cranston J's judgment is particularly significant because it clearly highlights the difficulties encountered by the courts in cases involving religious rights.
Adopting the methodology set out in Williamson, Cranston J held that athyesthi samskara was a manifestation of a genuine belief held in good faith. 91 Although certain 'minimum thresholds relating to seriousness, coherence and conformity' had to be satisfied, 92 it was 'emphatically not for the court to embark on an inquiry as to the validity of a belief by some standard such as a religious text or The judge then proceeded to consider the proportionality of the statutory curbs on open-air cremation.
In this regard he accepted that it was necessary to ban open-air funeral pyres, not because they would pose a risk to public safety or the environment, but rather because many people would find it 'abhorrent that human remains were being burned in this manner'. Thus, Cranston J held that there was no breach of Article 9 because the (supposed) legislative ban on funeral pyres was a proportionate response to the need to protect the sensibilities of the majority population.
This conclusion, and the deferential stance that led to it, sit uneasily with Cranston J's approach to the claimant's beliefs in the preliminary stages of his analysis. After all, early in his judgment, he expressly acknowledged not just that the performance of the sacrament anthyesthi samskara was a bona fide manifestation of the claimant's religious beliefs, but also that Mr Ghai genuinely believed that failure to perform it would have extremely grave consequences for him. Yet when it came to consideration of the proportionality of the prohibition, Cranston J readily deferred to the Government's view that it was necessary to prohibit this ritual so as to avoid possible offence to those who, whilst not personally witnessing such a funeral pyre, might object to it merely taking place. The type of offence being envisaged was thus indirect or secondary in nature since it would be caused not 98 Ibid, [121] . Cranston J cited Otto Preminger (n 96) and Şahin (n 77) in support of this point.
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Ibid, [122] .
by direct sensory contact with the activity in question, but rather at the mere thought of such activity occurring.
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It is this disconnect-between the acknowledged existential import of the religious practice to the individual believer, and the relatively trivial and attenuated nature of the purported 'harm' which the supposed ban was attempting to obviate-that is particularly significant in this case. In particular, it throws into clear focus the difficulties that the courts encounter when adjudicating religious rights, and it is to this issue that we now turn. By way of contrast it is at least arguable that, in respect of some other ECHR rights, there is a much closer correlation between the subjective reasons for them being valued by claimants invoking them, and the public reasons that courts can invoke in support of their protection. For example, it is axiomatic that freedom of political expression, protected by Article 10 of the ECHR, is vital for the maintenance of a democratic society. 114 This is a generally accessible 'public reason', which helps to explain why those exercising this right subjectively see it as being of such importance, as well as one of the reasons why the courts afford it a high level of protection. Thus, whilst both subjective and objective reasons can be adduced as to why freedom of political expression is unquestionably a public 'good', similar considerations tend not to apply to the manifestation of religion or belief.
Religion, Belief and Public Reason: What is to be Done?
Factors such as those discussed above help to explain the almost palpable sense of judicial unease whenever courts have to adjudicate on issues pertaining to manifestations of religious belief. 115 As
Benjamin Berger points out, the law 'displays a kind of anxiety and awkwardness with religion as 112
In the event none of these public reason arguments were deployed in Ghai. With claims that religious belief is under threat from 'rampant secularism … of the most intolerant and illiberal sort', 122 the danger is that many in religious communities will come to regard 'secular' human rights laws as offering them little chance of success, with the adjudicative deck of cards essentially stacked against them from the outset. At best this could lead to increasing disenchantment with the legal process-and at worst might even provoke anger in faith communities, ultimately leading to 'civil unrest'. 123 In spite of the apparent intractability of this problem, we contend that the solution is deceptively straightforward. It should certainly not be for courts to start drawing on reasons from comprehensive doctrines, as perhaps intimated by Lord Carey, which would undermine long held liberal notions of religious freedom. Instead, a preferable way forward would be for the courts, when adjudicating religious rights cases, to afford less deference to Government and Parliament. This would make it possible for judges to engage in a meaningful analysis of the proportionality of the restrictive measure(s) at issue, and enable them to facilitate the 'striking of a fair balance between the rights of
